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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 In this appeal, we are asked to consider whether the 
medical director and manager of a Medicare and Medicaid 
provider who supervised the payment of kickbacks occupied 
a position of trust for purposes of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual § 3B1.3 (2013), which provides for a two-level 
upward adjustment in offense level for abuse of a position of 
trust.  We hold that on the facts of this case, the District Court 
properly applied the adjustment, and that neither of the two 
remaining issues raised by Appellant has merit.  We, 
therefore, will affirm the judgment of sentence. 
 
I. 
 Dr. Ashokkumar R. Babaria was a licensed radiologist 
and the medical director and manager of Orange Community 
MRI, LLC (“Orange”), an authorized Medicare and Medicaid 
provider1 offering diagnostic testing, including Magnetic 
                                                 
1 The record is unclear as to whether Orange is properly 
categorized as a “supplier” or a “provider” in the context of 
Medicare and Medicaid.  The distinction, however, is not 
relevant for purposes of this appeal and we refer, as did the 
parties and the District Court, to Orange as a “provider” under 
both government programs.  
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Resonance Imaging (MRI), Computed Tomography (CT) 
scans, and ultrasounds.  In 2012, Dr. Babaria pleaded guilty 
to one count of making illegal payments—kickbacks—in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A) (the “anti-
kickback statute”).  He acknowledged that, from 2008 
through 2011, he paid physicians to refer their patients to 
Orange for diagnostic testing, and that he billed Medicare and 
Medicaid for diagnostic testing that was tainted by these 
corrupt referrals.  As a result, Orange received $2,014,600.85 
in payments from Medicare and Medicaid that were directly 
traceable to the kickback scheme.  There is no evidence, 
however, that Dr. Babaria falsified patient records, billed 
Medicare or Medicaid for testing that was not medically 
necessary, or otherwise compromised patient care. 
 
 At sentencing, Dr. Babaria objected to the Pre-
Sentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), which recommended 
that he receive a two-level adjustment for abuse of a position 
of trust pursuant to § 3B1.3, and a four-level adjustment for 
aggravating role pursuant to § 3B1.1(a), resulting in a 
recommended Guidelines range of 70-87 months’ 
imprisonment.  Ultimately, the Guidelines range as calculated 
in the PSR was 60 months, capped as it was by the statutory 
maximum for Dr. Babaria’s count of conviction.  He argued, 
however, that the sentencing adjustments were unwarranted 
and that the correct range was 37 to 46 months.  Following 
oral argument on these and other issues, at sentencing the 
District Court applied both adjustments but granted a 
downward variance and sentenced Dr. Babaria to 46 months’ 
imprisonment, a fine of $25,000, and a three-year term of 
supervised release.  The Court also ordered him to forfeit the 
$2,014,600.85 he conceded had been paid by Medicare and 
Medicaid.   
 
II. 
 Dr. Babaria argues that the District Court erred in 
applying the two-level adjustment under § 3B1.3 because he 
neither occupied nor abused a position of public or private 
trust.  That Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We “review de novo the legal 
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question of whether a position is one of trust under § 3B1.3 of 
the Guidelines, and we review for clear error whether a 
defendant abused that position.”  United States v. Sherman, 
160 F.3d 967, 969 (3d Cir. 1998).  While the standard by 
which a court must analyze whether a defendant’s conduct 
fits within the § 3B1.3 adjustment is well settled in our Court, 
whether the adjustment was properly applied under the 
factual circumstances of this case presents an issue of first 
impression.   
 
 Section 3B1.3 provides for a two-level upward 
adjustment in offense level where a defendant “abused a 
position of public or private trust . . . in a manner that 
significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the 
offense.” Application note one defines “public or private 
trust” as follows:   
 
“Public or private trust” refers to a position 
of public or private trust characterized by 
professional or managerial discretion (i.e., 
substantial discretionary judgment that is 
ordinarily given considerable deference). 
Persons holding such positions ordinarily are 
subject to significantly less supervision than 
employees whose responsibilities are 
primarily non-discretionary in nature. For 
this adjustment to apply, the position of 
public or private trust must have contributed 
in some significant way to facilitating the 
commission or concealment of the offense 
(e.g., by making the detection of the offense 
or the defendant’s responsibility for the 
offense more difficult). 
 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2013).  
We have held that “[t]he inquiry into whether a defendant 
was appropriately subject to a § 3B1.3 enhancement is two-
fold.”  Sherman, 160 F.3d at 969.  First, the court “must 
determine whether a defendant was placed in a position of 
trust,” and, if he was, it must then determine “whether he 
abused that position in a way that significantly facilitated his 
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crime.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Craddock, 993 F.2d 
338, 340 (3d Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 In determining whether a position of trust exists, we 
consider three factors:  “(1) whether the position allows the 
defendant to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the 
degree of authority to which the position vests in defendant 
vis-à-vis the object of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there 
has been reliance on the integrity of the person occupying the 
position.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 
1192 (3d Cir. 1994)).  These factors should be considered “in 
light of the guiding rationale of the section – to punish 
‘insiders’ who abuse their positions rather than those who 
take advantage of an available opportunity.”  Pardo, 25 F.3d 
at 1192. 
 
 While our Court has not yet addressed application of 
this adjustment in the context of a Medicare or Medicaid 
kickback scheme, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, in United 
States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776 (4th Cir. 1995), and United 
States v. Liss, 265 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2001), have done so, 
and have upheld application of the adjustment.  But see 
United States v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (D. Kan. 
1999) (rejecting application of the adjustment).  In Adam, the 
Fourth Circuit held that the adjustment was properly applied 
to a physician who received kickbacks in exchange for 
referrals.  70 F.3d at 778, 782.  Citing a House Ways and 
Means Committee Report, the court observed that Medicare 
and Medicaid fraud “is terribly difficult to detect because 
physicians exercise enormous discretion:  their judgments 
with respect to necessary treatments ordinarily receive great 
deference and it is difficult to prove that those judgments 
were made for reasons other than the patients’ best interests.”  
Id. at 782.  Accordingly, the court concluded that “[t]he 
position that Appellant enjoyed as a physician making claims 
for welfare funds” fit within § 3B1.3’s definition of a 
“position of trust.”  Id.   
 
 Citing Adam and “adopt[ing] its analysis and holding,” 
the Eleventh Circuit in Liss likewise upheld application of the 
adjustment where a physician had received illegal kickbacks 
in return for patient referrals.  265 F.3d at 1229-30.  The court 
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held that the physician occupied a position of trust, vis-à-vis 
Medicare, and abused that position of trust by receiving 
kickbacks, even where “the referrals were medically 
necessary,” and, as here, the physician “[did] not falsify 
patient records or submit fraudulent claims.”  Id. at 1229. 
 
 We hold that Dr. Babaria occupied a position of trust 
vis-à-vis Medicare and Medicaid as the medical director and 
manager of Orange, an authorized provider.  On behalf of 
Orange, he certified compliance with the anti-kickback 
statute2, but nevertheless utilized his position as Orange’s 
medical director and manager to supervise and conceal the 
payment of kickbacks, a difficult-to-detect offense.  Our 
decision is consistent not only with Adam and Liss, but also 
with our precedent in United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190 
(3d Cir. 1999), in which we held that the §3B1.3 adjustment 
was properly applied to the president of a defense contracting 
company who made false certifications to the government and 
utilized his position as company president to supervise and 
conceal fraudulent activity.  In Nathan, we held that the 
defendant occupied a position of trust because, “as president 
of the company, [he] was in a unique position to make 
decisions for the company and to decide how [it] would fill 
the government contracts,” and, because there was no one 
supervising his acts, “he held a position that allowed him to 
commit wrongs, and that permitted him to make those wrongs 
harder to detect” by directing subordinates to cover up the 
offense.  Id. at 207.  So too here, there was no one supervising 
Dr. Babaria’s position as the medical director and manager of 
Orange and no dispute that, in those positions, he was in a 
unique position to decide to pay illegal referral fees, 
payments he made and concealed over a period of several 
years. 
 
 In summary, unlike a lower-level employee of a 
Medicare or Medicaid provider, Dr. Babaria was the 
                                                 
2 The record contains examples of Dr. Babaria’s certifications 
to Medicare, but not Medicaid.  At sentencing, however, Dr. 
Babaria did not take issue with the District Court’s finding 
that he had made certifications to both Medicare and 
Medicaid.   
 7 
authorizing official who certified Orange’s compliance with 
the anti-kickback statute, and was not subject to any 
supervision over his actions with respect to the business and 
its relationship with the government programs.  He was, 
without question, an “insider[]” who “abuse[d] [his] 
position[],” not merely an individual who took advantage of 
an available opportunity.  See Pardo, 25 F.3d at 1192.  
Indeed, Dr. Babaria’s position contributed in a “significant 
way to facilitating the commission or concealment of the 
offense,” see § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1, because his level of authority 
and the lack of supervision over his actions enabled him to 
commit the offense and evade detection. 
 
 One final note on the § 3B1.3 adjustment.  At all times 
over the several years during which this offense was 
committed, Dr. Babaria was a licensed radiologist in addition 
to serving as medical director and manager of Orange.  We 
have acknowledged that the mere possession of a medical 
license “does not mandate a § 3B1.3 enhancement.”  See 
Sherman, 160 F.3d at 970-71.  We have held, however, that 
“where a defendant obtains his minimally-supervised position 
by virtue of his professional training and license and then 
takes advantage of the discretion granted to him in a way 
which significantly facilitates the fraud, we can rightly say 
that he has abused a position of trust.”  Id. at 971.  While Dr. 
Babaria need not have been a licensed radiologist in order for 
Orange to have become an authorized Medicare and Medicaid 
provider, or in order for him to hold the position of medical 
director and manager, we cannot ignore the likelihood that his 
professional training and license contributed in a significant 
way to his ability to obtain his position and to supervise 
Orange’s activities vis-à-vis Medicare and Medicaid.  In 
certifying to Medicare, e.g., that Orange agreed to comply 
with the anti-kickback statute, Dr. Babaria specifically 
indicated his status as a medical doctor.  (See Supp. App. at 
30-31.)   For these reasons, it was not erroneous for the 
District Court to consider that status when applying the 
adjustment. 
 
 We are mindful of the fact that, as we have observed, 
“a court should hesitate before defining the concept [of a 
position of trust] too broadly, as there is a component of 
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misplaced trust inherent in the concept of fraud.”  See United 
States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  That having been said, 
however, we have no difficulty in affirming the well reasoned 
decision of the District Court applying the adjustment on the 
facts of this case.    
 
III. 
 Dr. Babaria also argues that the District Court erred in 
applying a four-level upward adjustment in offense level for 
aggravating role, and by failing to give meaningful 
consideration, as it was required to do under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a), to certain of his sentencing arguments.  We have 
carefully reviewed these arguments and find them to be 
without merit.3  The Court did not err in concluding that Dr. 
Babaria acted as an organizer or leader in connection with the 
offense, in light of his admitted conduct in supervising the 
payment of referral fees to numerous physicians, as well as 
the Court’s own familiarity with the criminal culpability of 
the many related participants in the scheme who had already 
pled guilty before it.  We likewise conclude, having 
thoroughly reviewed the 128-page transcript of Dr. Babaria’s 
sentencing, that “the record as a whole reflects rational and 
meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 
(3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 
IV. 
 We will affirm the judgment of sentence. 
                                                 
3 We review the District Court’s determination with respect to 
the aggravating role adjustment for clear error, see United 
States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 378 (3d Cir. 2001), and we 
review for abuse of discretion whether the Court gave 
“meaningful consideration” to Dr. Babaria’s sentencing 
arguments.  See United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 
258 n.7, 259 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).   
